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The U.S. retail grocery industry shifted from an industry dominated by small grocers serving local markets to one 
characterized by large retailers present in international markets. Average retail grocery concentration as measured by 
CR4 increased from 19.9 in 1997 to 31.0 in 2002 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2000; 2005). 
Wal-Mart’s tremendous growth is the catalyst to this change, but little is known about Wal-Mart’s effect on market 
concentration. This analysis evaluates the effects of de novo entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters on retail grocery concen-
tration. The effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on changes in retail grocery concentration is estimated using econometric 
modeling. The results show that existing Wal-Mart Supercenter operations and entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters sig-
nificantly increase the rate of change in retail grocery concentration.
Martens is assistant professor, College of Business, Iowa State 
University, Ames. 
During the past two decades the U.S. retail grocery 
industry has seen a contraction of small “Mom and 
Pop” retailers, large chain retailers created via merg-
ers and acquisitions, and the de novo entry of su-
percenters stores by Wal-Mart and Target (Kaufman 
2002). The average retail grocery concentration, as 
measured by the sum of market share of the top four 
firms (CR4), increased by 56 percent in just five 
years, rising from 19.9 in 1997 to 31.0 in 2002 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 
2000; 2005).1 Grocery has rapidly shifted from an 
industry dominated by small grocers serving local 
markets to one characterized by large retailers pres-
ent in international markets. 
Wal-Mart is often at the heart of the media’s 
reporting of the grocery industry’s changes; due in 
part to its rapid growth and size (e.g., Smith 2004; 
Cleeland and Goldman 2003). In 1987 Wal-Mart 
did not sell a full line of groceries. By 2002, the 
company had surpassed Kroger Foods to become 
the largest grocery retailer in the United States. 
This rapid growth is expected to continue, with one 
prediction that Wal-Mart will control 35 percent 
of the U.S. retail grocery sales for many consumer 
products by 2010 (Clarke 2005). 
This has triggered a wave of mergers, further 
increasing concentration (Cotterill 2001). The 
Schumpeterian economic tradition would suggest 
that “creative destruction” introduced by an entrant 
with new technology or processes (i.e., Wal-Mart’s 
efficient supply-chain-management practices) 
drives economic progress. However, concerns have 
emerged that the largest grocers are using their low 
cost structure, along with advantages in marketing, 
store design, and shelf space allocations, to harm 
consumers. In fact, Wal-Mart’s retail grocery sales 
have been shown to have “substantial impacts” on 
regional economies (Boarnet et al. 2005). 
This paper evaluates the effects of de novo entry 
by Wal-Mart Supercenters on retail grocery concen-
tration (CR4). Understanding Wal-Mart’s influence 
on market concentration is important to support or 
discredit critics who charge that large grocers use 
their market position to reduce consumer access 
to groceries (Blanchard and Lyson 2002), increase 
retailer market power (Foer 1999), and discourage 
competition (Federal Trade Commission 2001). 
Such practices might be possible for firms with a 
strong influence on market concentration. In addi-
tion, an extensive literature shows a pattern linking 
retail grocery market concentration to increases in 
retail grocery prices. 
Yu and Connor (2002) note that only the banking 
and airline industries have received more empirical 
price-concentration analysis than the retail grocery 
industry. Of the many grocery price-concentration 
studies (Marion et al. 1979; Cotterill 1986; Bin-
kley and Connor 1998; Cotterill 1999), only two 
(Kaufman and Handy 1989; Newmark 1990) did 
not find a positive relationship between market 
concentration and price. Moreover, the findings in 
both of those studies have been refuted by Cotterill 
(1993) and Yu and Connor (2002). 
Contrary to the findings of traditional retail 
1 NAICS code 4451 (Grocery stores) was used to calculate 
CR4. This does not include grocery sales from supercenter 
and warehouse stores.
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grocery concentration-price literature, Wal-Mart 
entry is associated with lower, not higher, retail 
grocery prices (Leibtag 2005). Higher mark-ups 
resulting from increased market concentration in 
the retail grocery industry are offset by discounts 
arising from greater efficiency (Dobson and Water-
son 1997). Dobson and Waterson conclude that the 
effects from changes in market structure depend on 
the relationship between market power and scale 
economies. Aalto-Setala (2002) found “there is 
no need to constrain directly the growth of larger 
stores (in Finland) from an anti-trust perspective as 
long as there is sufficient competition.” Thus while 
cost efficiencies from scale economies appear to 
temper at least part of the mark-up resulting from 
increased market concentration, competition still 
remains important. 
Literature
Location and market-concentration theories are 
studied in field of industrial economics. These two 
related theories will be used to specify a model 
to determine Wal-Mart’s effects on retail grocery 
concentration. First, an empirical study evaluating 
Wal-Mart’s effects on retail grocery concentration 
will be reviewed.
Empirical Retail Grocery Concentration Study
Franklin (2001) is the only study found in a litera-
ture search evaluating Wal-Mart’s effects on retail 
grocery concentration. His work examined the 
largest 100 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
using Trade Dimension’s Market Scope data. Based 
on descriptive statistics, Franklin concluded that 
“Wal-Mart Supercenter entry had little impact on 
food seller concentration in 19 major metropolitan 
areas between 1993 and 1998.” Franklin estimated 
univariate and multivariate ordinary least squares 
models to determine whether Wal-Mart entry and 
CR4 are related to income, population, or time since 
Wal-Mart entered a MSA. He found a negative re-
lationship between median household income and 
Wal-Mart’s market share and a positive relationship 
between the time since entering an MSA and Wal-
Mart’s market share.
Franklin’s analysis only evaluated the effects of 
Wal-Mart Supercenters on retail grocery concen-
tration in large metropolitan areas. At the time of 
Franklin’s study, only 188 of the 721 (26 percent) 
Wal-Mart Supercenters operated in the largest 100 
metropolitan areas, suggesting that Wal-Mart’s fo-
cus is not on metropolitan areas. In 2006 nearly 500 
of the 1,980 Wal-Mart Supercenters were located 
in counties with a largest city of fewer than 20,000 
people (Artz and Stone 2006).
While Wal-Mart Supercenters may not be pen-
etrating metropolitan markets, the effect of Wal-
Mart Supercenters on retail grocery concentration 
in lesser populated areas may be substantial. Several 
researchers have found that Wal-Mart significantly 
affects a host town or trade area (Singh, Hansen, and 
Blattberg 2004; Woo et al. 2001; Capps and Grif-
fin 1998; Stone 1997). Two recent articles model 
the effects of supercenter and warehouse stores on 
retail grocery sales. First, Artz and Stone (2006) 
found that a Wal-Mart Supercenter in a non-metro-
politan county captures 17 percent of the existing 
grocery market within two years. Second, entry by 
a supercenter into low-population-density counties 
increased growth in sales by over 49 percent but did 
not lead to a growth in sales in metropolitan counties 
(Martens, Florax, and Dooley 2005). 
This paper refines the pioneering analysis by 
Franklin (2001) in three ways. First, given dif-
ferences in population density, Franklin’s data are 
expanded from the 100 MSAs focused on urban ar-
eas to contiguous grocery marketing areas (GMAs) 
containing both metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas. Second, the regression-model explanatory 
variables are based on location and market-con-
centration theories. Finally, the empirical model 
considers the existing operation of and new entry 
by Wal-Mart Supercenters along with the reaction 
by the chief competitors in terms of entry and exit. 
A discussion of the variables gleaned from location 
theory and previous concentration studies follows. 
These variables will be used to specify the change 
in retail market concentration model. 
Theory and Independent Variables
In general, early concentration studies typically ex-
amined the determinants of concentration levels, 
while more recent studies considered the drivers of 
change in market concentration (Curry and George 
1983). The goal of this study is not to explain why 
a market is concentrated, but to explain why mar-
ket concentration is changing. Therefore, change in 
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concentration (ΔCR4) will be the dependent vari-
able. In the retail grocery industry, ΔCR4 is positive 
for most GMAs, consistent with increasing concen-
tration experienced in the grocery industry.
The independent variables were defined using 
both location and market-concentration theories. 
Location theory seeks to explain the geographical 
concentration of firms on the basis of competition 
and economic efficiency (Brulhart 1998; Sutton 
1998). Similarly, market-concentration theory seeks 
to explain why markets become concentrated (Curry 
and George 1983). Table 1 lists variables important 
to location theory and market concentration theory 
(Brulhart 1998; Sutton 1998; Curry and George 
1983; Hannan and Freeman 1977). 
Research coming from these theories suggests 
the most important explanatory variable of change 
in market concentration is initial concentration. 
As industries become more concentrated a firm’s 
ability to gain market share at the expense of oth-
ers becomes more difficult (Connor, Rogers, and 
Bhagavan 1996). In this study the initial level of 
grocery-industry concentration, as measured by the 
sum of the top four firms’ market shares (CR4), will 
be used to express market concentration. CR4 is ex-
pected to have a negative relationship with ΔCR4. 
Market size and market growth are also com-
mon to location theory and market concentration 
(Table 1). These market variables are expected to 
have negative relationships with change in market 
concentration for three reasons. First, large markets 
may allow room for fringe firms to serve individual 
consumers with similar preferences. Second, in fast-
growing markets incumbents may struggle to take 
advantage of growth opportunities, allowing new 
firms to gain market share. Third, growth may attract 
new firms, further decreasing concentration. 
For this study, initial population density and 
initial retail grocery sales are proxies for market 
size, while change in population density is a proxy 
for market growth. As discussed in the proceeding 
paragraph, higher population density and increasing 
population density are expected to decrease ΔCR4, 
so negative signs are expected. Higher levels of ini-
tial retail grocery sales also are expected to decrease 
future changes in concentration (i.e., negative sign), 
but at a decreasing rate. Therefore the log of initial 
grocery sales was used in this model. 
From Table 1, a fourth set of variables is tech-
nology and economies of scale. Technology allows 
existing firms to be more productive, forcing out 
less-competitive firms and increasing market con-
centration. Similarly, economies of scale encourage 
firms to grow, also increasing market concentra-
tion. The retail grocery industry experiences the 
effects of technology and economies of scale as 
large grocers such as Wal-Mart Supercenters enter 
markets. 
For this study, four variables are used to proxy 
economies of scale and technology. First is the 
percentage of retailers classified as independent. 
Groceries are sold by both independent retailers and 
retail chains. Over time, independent retailers have 
been exiting while large retail chains use technology 
and economies of size to capture additional market 
share. GMAs with a higher percentage of indepen-
dent retailers are likely to have less technology and 
a smaller average size, so a positive relationship 
between initial percentage of independent stores and 
change in concentration is expected. Markets with a 
high percentage of independent retailers are likely 
the next battle grounds for market share between 
Wal-Mart and other large retail grocers.
The count of and changes in the number of Wal-
Table1. Key Independent Variables from Location and Concentration Theory.
Variable Location theory Concentration theory
Initial concentration X X
Initial market size X X
Industry (market) growth X X
Innovation / economies of scale X X
Trade costs / entry barriers X X
Resource endowments X
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Mart Supercenters and stores operated by the top 
two competitors are the remaining variables used to 
describe the initial level of technology and econo-
mies of scale in local grocery markets. Positive 
signs are expected on these incumbent and entrant 
store variables because concentration is expected 
to increase as additional large stores compete for 
market share. 
Finally, resource endowments, important in 
location literature, draw additional competitors 
into a market and increases competition, lowering 
concentration (Brulhart 1998). In the retail grocery 
industry, the number of local distribution centers is 
used as a proxy for proximity to resources. Stores 
in GMAs with more distribution centers are less 
likely to exit a market because the local market 
structure offers the stores more resources to remain 
competitive, resulting in a negative relationship be-
tween the count of distribution centers and change 
in concentration.
Specification and Data
Based upon the literature, the following model was 
specified:
(1)
 ∆CR4i,(t+1)-t = ß0 + ß1(CR4i,t) + ß2(CPi,t) + 
ß3(∆CPi,(t+1)-t) + ß4(Yeart) + ß5(PInd) + ß6(DCi,t) 
+ ß7(Pdni,t) + ß8(∆Pdn i,(t+1)-t) + ß9(ln Sales) + 
ß10(WMi,t) + ß11(∆WM i,(t+1)-t) + εi,t ,
where ∆CR4i,(t+1)-t is the change in four-firm con-
centration (CR4) in GMA i from year t to t+1; 
CR4i,t is the concentration level in GMA i in year t; 
CPi,t is the count of stores operated by the top two 
firms (not including Wal-Mart) in GMA i in year t; 
∆CPi,,(t+1)-t is the change in the count of stores oper-
ated by the top two firms (not including Wal-Mart) 
in GMA i, from year t to t+1; Yeart is a dummy 
variable for each year t = 1999, 2000, 2001; Pind i,t 
is the percentage of total grocery stores classified 
as independent in GMA i in year t; DCi,t is the total 
number of grocery distribution centers in GMA i in 
year t; Pdni,t is the initial population density in GMA 
i in year t; ∆Pdni,,(t+1)-t is the change in population 
density in GMA i from year t to t+1; Log(Salesi,t) 
is the log of total grocery sales in GMA i in year 
t; ∆WMi,,(t+1)-t is the change in number of Wal-Mart 
Supercenters in GMA i, from year t to t+1; and 
WMi,t is the count of Wal-Mart Supercenter stores 
in GMA i in year t.
As in Franklin (2001), data were obtained from 
the Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook and 
Market Scope (2000–2004). Instead of taking data 
for MSAs, here the spatial unit was defined as a gro-
cery marketing area (GMA). A GMA is defined and 
monitored by Trade Dimensions on the basis of dis-
tribution center locations, transportation flows, and 
physical boundaries. As such, they can be viewed 
as 50 distinct geographical regions, with differing 
competitors. The geographical size of each of the 50 
GMAs varies, but most are approximately the size 
of an average U.S. state. All contain metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan counties. While GMAs fol-
low county boundaries, they do not follow state 
boundaries. 
Unfortunately, GMA boundaries change over 
time because grocery retailing evolves, and Trade 
Dimensions adjusts their market boundary defini-
tions accordingly. Of the 50 total GMAs, 17 un-
derwent some type of boundary change between 
1999 and 2003. In addition, the “Fargo GMA” data 
contained inconsistencies, so it was excluded from 
the data set. Therefore, only 32 of the 50 GMAs 
had usable data for the years 1999 through 2003 
(Figure 1). Earlier data were not available because 
Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook did not 
publish GMA level market share data for all retailers 
before 1999. After annual changes were calculated, 
four years of observations remained for each of the 
32 GMAs, or 128 observations. While discarding 
observations is always regrettable, the omission of 
the East and West Coast markets is not critical to this 
analysis because Wal-Mart only had a limited pres-
ence in these markets between 1999 and 2003.
It is important to note that Trade Dimensions 
states that they only use sales from grocery and 
grocery-related products when defining market 
share. Therefore, even though Wal-Mart sells a 
full line of general merchandise, the sales used to 
compute market share and market concentration are 
only those for products sold in a typical retail grocer 
store. Therefore, entry by a Wal-Mart Supercenter 
does not overstate typical retail sales.
Descriptive statistics are found in Table 2. The 
sample of 32 GMAs had a mean CR4 of 59.8, which 
is much higher than the 2002 national CR4 level of 
31 for two reasons. First, the national CR4 is not 
an average, while our mean CR4 is an average of 
multiple GMAs. Our average CR4 captures the large 
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ranges in retail grocery concentration resulting from 
differences in metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas (Table 2). Such variations in concentration 
are consistent with claims that food is purchased 
in local markets, meaning local conditions heavily 
influence local CR4 (Cotterill 1986). Second, data 
were not available for the east and west coasts of 
the United States, areas with relatively lower retail 
grocery concentration. 
The sample had an average annual change in 
CR4 of 1.1 from 1999 to 2003, but change in CR4 
ranged from −6.3 in the Milwaukee GMA to 8.3 
in the Springfield GMA (Table 2). The GMAs had 
an average of 18.8 initial Wal-Mart Supercenters, 
ranging from zero in the Detroit GMA to 83 in the 
Memphis GMA. On average, 4.3 new Wal-Mart 
Supercenters were added to each GMA each of the 
four years, but 18 new stores entered the Mem-
phis GMA. The standard deviation of the change 
in Wal-Mart Supercenters was high: 3.9. Finally, 
the percentage of retail grocery stores classified as 
independent ranged from 9.4 percent in the Tampa 
GMA to 68.1 percent in the Milwaukee GMA.
When Wal-Mart Supercenters enter, competitors 
can respond by opening new stores to compete, by 
exiting and closing stores, or by doing nothing. An-
nually, the top two competitors in each GMA open 
2.3 new stores on average (Table 2). The range of 
change in competitors was as low as 54 competitors 
exiting the New Orleans GMA and as high as 56 
competitor stores entering the Dallas GMA. This 
suggests that some competitors in some GMAs are 
opening new stores or merging as a reaction to Wal-
Mart’s entry while competitors in other GMAs are 
exiting. Table 3 lists the top two competitors in each 
GMAs during 1999.
Figure 2 shows the GMAs with the 50th to 90th 
percentile level of concentration in gray and 90th 
to 100th percentile of concentration in black. Visu-
ally, one can see that GMAs in parts of Florida, 
Texas, and Arizona are in the top decile of concen-
trated GMAs, while concentration levels are mixed 
through the rest of the study area. Similarly, Figure 
3 shows the change in concentration for the GMAs 
by percentile. Note that many of the white GMAs 
in Figure 2 (<50th percentile of CR4) are gray or 
black in Figure 3, showing that lesser-concentrated 
GMAs are experiencing the greatest increases in 
concentration, which is consistent with results from 
previous concentration studies.
Diagnostics
The four years of data for the 32 GMAs were 
stacked to form a panel (a cross-section of obser-
vations over time) of 128 total observations. The 
panel has both a spatial dimension (GMAs) and a 
temporal (time in years) dimension. Two types of 
models used to evaluate panel data are fixed and 
random effects models, which Greene (2000) de-
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Grocery Industry, 1999 to 2003.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Range
CR4 59.8 13.1 24.0 89.1
ΔCR4 1.1 2.8 -6.3 8.3
Sales $9,028,095 3,570,478 $1,618,636 $16,560,859 
Pop. density 151.2 168.3 4.8 748.7
ΔPop. density  2  8 −43  41
# Wal-Marts 18.8 17.1  0  83
Δ # Wal-Marts 4.3 3.9 −7  18
Competitors 172.6 90.9  38  464
ΔCompetitors 2.3 13.7 −54  56
% Independent 37.7% 15.8% 9.4% 68.1%
Source: Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook and Market Scope (1999–2000, 2002–2003).
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Table 3. Top Two Competitors by GMA in 1999.
GMA 1st competitor 2nd competitor
Atlanta Kroger Publix Super Markets
Billings Albertson’s SuperValu
Chicago Jewel Food Stores Dominicks Finer Foods
Cincinnati Kroger Roundy’s
Cleveland Giant Eagle Tops Markets
Dallas Albertson’s Tom Thumb
Denver King Soopers Safeway Inc.
Des Moines HyVee Food Stores Fareway Stores, Inc
Detroit Farmer Jack Kroger
Grand Rapids Spartan Stores Meijer
Houston Kroger H E Butt Grocery
Indianapolis Kroger SuperValu
Jacksonville Winn-Dixie Stores Publix Super Markets
Kansas City Associated Wholesale Dillon Food Stores
Louisville Kroger Winn-Dixie Stores
Memphis Kroger Jitney Jungle Stores
Miami Publix Super Markets Winn-Dixie Stores
Milwaukee Sentry Shultz Sav O Stores
Minneapolis Cub Foods Rainbow Food Stores
Nashville Kroger Food Lion
New Orleans Winn-Dixie Jitney Jungle Stores
Oklahoma City Homeland Stores, Inc Albertsons Inc.
Omaha HyVee Food Stores Bakers Supermarkets
Phoenix Frys Food Stores Bashas Markets
Salt Lake City Albertson’s Smith’s Food
San Antonio H E Butt Grocery Albertsons Inc.
Seattle Safeway Inc. Quality Food Centers, Inc
Spokane Safeway Inc. Albertsons Inc.
Springfield Woods Supermarkets, Inc Ramey/Price Cutter Supermarkets
St. Louis Schnuck Markets Kroger
Tampa Publix Super Markets Winn-Dixie
Source: Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook (2000).
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scribes in detail. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is 
inappropriate because it assumes identical coeffi-
cients across every GMA in the sample. In the fixed 
effects model, slopes are constant and intercepts 
vary either by the cross-section (GMA), time, or 
both. To determine whether statistically significant 
differences exist across groups (e.g., GMAs), an F 
test is used to test for R2 change. A random effects 
model is a regression with a random constant term 
or a mean value plus a random error. In a random 
effects model, some omitted variables may be con-
stant over time and vary among GMAs, while others 
are fixed between cases but vary over time. 
The Hausman specification test is used to deter-
mine whether the fixed or random effects model is 
most appropriate. If there is significant correlation 
between unobserved random effects and the regres-
sors, the fixed effects model will be best because 
it allows for correlation between the independent 
variables and unobserved effect. If, however, there 
is no significant correlation between unobserved 
random effects and the regressors, the random 
effects model would be more powerful because 
time-constant factors can be included. In addition, 
the models will be tested for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation using the Breusch-Pagan test 
(Breusch and Pagan 1979) and a test developed by 
Woolridge (2002), respectively.
The panel data were run in both fixed and random 
effect models, and the Hausman test resulted in a 
P-value of 0.000. Therefore the fixed effects model, 
which allows for correlation between the indepen-
dent variables and unobserved effects, was used for 
the results shown in Table 4. The Breusch-Pagan 
and Woodridge tests found no causes of inefficiency 
from heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. The F 
test rejects the null hypothesis that all GMAs are 
alike (i.e., u_i = 0), so the fixed effects are the result 
of significant statistical differences across GMAs. 
As expected, a high rho value of 0.97 suggests 
Table 4. Econometric Results for Change in Concentration Model.
Group variable (i): GMA   No. of observations = 128
R2 Within = 0.4314  Number of groups = 32
R2 Between = 0.0404   sigma_u = 13.53
R2 Overall = 0.0282   sigma_e = 2.19
Prob > F = 0.000   Rho (var. due to u_i) 0.97
Coeff. Std. err. t P > |t| [95% conf. interval]
CR4 −0.5554 0.0958 −5.80 0.000 −0.746 −0.365
CP 0.0261 0.0250 1.04 0.301 −0.024 0.076
ΔCP 0.0431 0.0216 2.00 0.049 0.000 0.086
Y99 0.4477 1.1238 0.40 0.691 −1.788 2.683
Y00 −0.0082 0.8389 −0.01 0.992 −1.677 1.660
Y01 −0.9314 0.6500 −1.43 0.156 −2.224 0.361
PInd −9.5768 6.5008 −1.47 0.144 −22.507 3.353
DC 0.0228 0.4088 0.06 0.956 −0.790 0.836
Pdn −0.0689 0.0453 −1.52 0.132 −0.159 0.021
ΔPdn −0.0080 0.0527 −0.15 0.880 −0.113 0.097
lnSales 4.5939 4.6311 0.99 0.324 −4.617 13.805
WM 0.1343 0.0616 2.18 0.032 0.012 0.257
ΔWM 0.1621 0.0899 1.80 0.075 −0.017 0.341
F(13,83) = 4.84 that all u_i=0; Prob > F = 0.000
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that most of the model’s variation comes from the 
fixed effects (GMAs), meaning the model accounts 
for the major differences across the GMAs as well 
as changes over time. It follows that the highest 
R2 is from within the groups (GMAs) (Table 4). 
Considering the many unknown factors that might 
affect retail grocery market concentration, this R2 is 
believed to be quite good. The R2 between GMAs 
and the overall R2 are much lower, a common out-
come for fixed effects models (Bjorklund 1989; 
Baltagi 1995). 
Results and Discussion
Four variables (CR4, WM, ΔWM, and ΔCP) had 
statistically significant relationships with the change 
in CR4. Although the remaining variables were not 
significant at the ten-percent level, there were theo-
retically sound reasons for including the variables. 
Therefore, the variables were left in the model to 
control for variation associated with these important 
location and market concentration theory factors.
The result from CR4 (the beginning level of 
CR4) was significant at the one-percent level with 
a negative sign, as expected. In this study and in 
past manufacturing market concentration stud-
ies, higher initial market concentration results in 
smaller future changes in market concentration. 
This describes how the market is converging to a 
new, higher level of concentration. 
Wal-Mart has a significant positive affect on the 
change in CR4, with the initial number of Wal-Mart 
supercenter stores (WM) variable significant at the 
five-percent level. The WM coefficient was 0.1343, 
which, by itself, shows that the existing operation 
of an individual Wal-Mart Supercenter has a rela-
tively small effect on the rate of market concentra-
tion change. However, Wal-Mart operates multiple 
stores in geographical areas which, combined, have 
a significant affect on the rate of market concentra-
tion change. For example, on average about 19 Wal-
Mart Supercenters operated in each GMA, meaning 
the typical GMA would expect an increase in the 
change in CR4 of about 2.5 points annually due to 
the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters.
The coefficient for the change in the number 
of Wal-Mart Supercenters (ΔWM) is 0.1621 and is 
significant at the ten-percent level. Annually, about 
four new Wal-Mart Supercenters entered the typical 
GMA. Therefore, the average GMA experienced an 
increase in change in concentration of about 0.69 
points due to Wal-Mart Supercenter expansion. 
Individual GMAs experienced a greater expan-
sion of Wal-Mart Supercenters. For example, in 
the Memphis GMA, the average annual effect of 
entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters was 2.19 points, a 
high number considering that the mean change in 
concentration was only 1.11 points. 
Finally, the change in the count of stores oper-
ated by the top two firms in each GMA (ΔCP) was 
positive and significant at the five-percent level. 
Whether the top two competitors are expanding and 
merging due to Wal-Mart or not, their expansion 
and mergers are increasing the annual change in 
CR4 by 0.10 points, on average. The Atlanta GMA 
experienced the greatest average annual change in 
concentration due to ΔCP (0.86 points), while the 
average annual change in concentration in New Or-
leans fell by 0.58 points due to changes in the count 
of stores operated by the top competitors (ΔCP).
Discussion
The effects of de novo entry by Wal-Mart supercent-
ers on retail grocery concentration were evaluated 
for 32 relatively large GMAs, covering most of the 
United States. The results support the hypothesis 
that Wal-Mart is increasing retail grocery concentra-
tion. Existing Wal-Mart stores increased the change 
in concentration by 0.13 points per store and entry 
by new Wal-Mart Supercenters further increased the 
change in concentration by 0.16 points per store. 
The average four-year combined effects of exist-
ing Wal-Mart Supercenters and entry by Wal-Mart 
Supercenters increased concentration annually in a 
range from 0.16 points in the Seattle GMA to 10.95 
points in the Memphis GMA (Table 5). 
Although the effect of entry by Wal-Mart Su-
percenters on change in concentration is four times 
greater per store than the effect of entry by one of 
the top two competitors (0.04), consideration of the 
effect of entry by a top competitor remains impor-
tant. The average annual change in the number of 
top two competitors (ΔCP) was positive for 22 of 
the 32 GMAs, with the New Orleans GMA losing an 
average of 54 competitors annually and the Atlanta 
GMA gaining an average of 20 competitors annu-
ally. Frequent mergers, consolidations, divestures, 
and buyouts account for some of the changes in top 
competitors. The regression results show the effect 
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Albuquerque 1.2 −8 −0.34 25 3.32 3 0.53 3.85
Atlanta 2.0 20 0.86 20 2.65 5 0.73 3.38
Billings −0.2 −3 −0.11 3 0.40 2 0.32 0.73
Chicago −1.8 1 0.02 9 1.18 1 0.16 1.34
Cincinnati 0.8 0 −0.01 15 2.05 5 0.77 2.82
Cleveland 2.4 −6 −0.26 7 0.97 1 0.16 1.14
Dallas 1.4 17 0.71 57 7.66 11 1.70 9.36
Denver 0.6 8 0.32 17 2.25 6 0.97 3.22
Des Moines 1.2 1 0.05 13 1.78 5 0.85 2.63
Detroit 3.2 1 0.03 1 0.10 1 0.08 0.18
Grand Rapids 2.8 2 0.08 2 0.20 3 0.45 0.65
Houston 1.3 7 0.29 21 2.75 9 1.46 4.21
Indianapolis 3.2 8 0.33 21 2.85 5 0.81 3.66
Jacksonville −0.1 6 0.25 19 2.59 3 0.49 3.07
Kansas 2.1 2 0.10 28 3.73 5 0.81 4.54
Louisville 1.7 1 0.05 18 2.42 4 0.65 3.07
Memphis 0.2 −4 −0.16 65 8.76 14 2.19 10.95
Miami −0.6 3 0.13 4 0.57 2 0.24 0.81
Milwaukee −0.8 2 0.09 7 0.87 4 0.69 1.56
Minneapolis −0.6 3 0.13 2 0.20 2 0.28 0.49
Nashville 2.0 −4 −0.16 44 5.88 5 0.85 6.73
New Orleans 2.4 −14 −0.58 29 3.89 3 0.45 4.34
Oklahoma 3.0 −6 −0.25 34 4.53 7 1.05 5.59
Omaha 1.5 5 0.19 7 0.94 2 0.32 1.26
Phoenix 2.9 9 0.40 7 0.91 4 0.61 1.51
Salt Lake City −0.3 0 0.00 7 0.97 7 1.09 2.07
San Antonio 1.5 3 0.14 24 3.19 5 0.77 3.96
Seattle −0.6 10 0.44 0 0.03 1 0.12 0.16
Spokane −1.5 3 0.12 1 0.13 1 0.20 0.34
Springfield 3.7 1 0.05 32 4.30 4 0.57 4.86
St. Louis 1.3 −2 −0.09 35 4.73 5 0.73 5.46
Tampa −0.1 8 0.33 31 4.13 7 1.09 5.22
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of competitors on change in concentration ranged 
from negative 0.58 points to positive 0.86 points for 
the New Orleans and Atlanta GMAs, respectively 
(Table 5). 
With Wal-Mart Supercenters increasing the 
change in market concentration in all 32 GMAs, 
understanding whether and where Wal-Mart Super-
centers face strong market competition becomes 
important to guide policy makers, those involved 
in the retail grocery industry, and consumers. The 
data were evaluated several ways, and two groups 
or regimes of GMAs emerged—one regime with a 
strong Wal-Mart presence and another regime with 
a weaker Wal-Mart presence. Regime 1 consisted 
of 13 GMAs, each with more than 20 Wal-Mart 
Supercenters operating annually, while Regime 2 
consisted of the remaining 19 GMAs, each with 
fewer than 20 Wal-Mart Supercenters operating 
annually (Table 6). 
The Regimes helped draw two important gener-
alized conclusions about the level of competition 
between Wal-Mart’s and the top two competitors. 
First, on average the top two competitors (ΔCP) are 
entering Regime 2, but not Regime 1 where Wal-
Mart’s market presence is stronger. Average ΔCP 
is 3.4 in Regime 2 compared 0.7 in Regime 1, and 
only two of the nine GMAs with negative ΔCP were 
in Regime 2 (Table 6).2 Second, on average Wal-
Mart opens more than twice as many Supercenters 
in Regime 1, where their presence is already strong. 
The average change in Wal-Mart Supercenters was 
6.2 in Regime 1, compared to only 3.0 in Regime 
2 (Table 6). Furthermore, the correlation between 
the count of Wal-Mart Supercenters and entry by 
Wal-Mart Supercenters was 0.78. 
The descriptive statistics based on regimes sug-
gest that Wal-Mart is meeting less resistance in mar-
kets where their market presence is established, and 
thus Wal-Mart is responsible for increasing market 
concentration at a faster rate. In this case, Wal-Mart 
Supercenters may be taking more of their market 
share from other large competitors who are choos-
ing not to expand or even to exit the market. In re-
gimes where Wal-Mart is less established, competi-
tors are entering with additional stores, suggesting 
that Regime 2’s large competitors are more willing 
to fight for market share. In Regime 2 GMAs, Wal-
Mart likely faces stronger competition, so smaller 
supermarkets will probably be forced give up more 
market share as Wal-Mart and the top competitors 
fight for market share. 
Implications and Research Suggestions
This research should help those involved in the re-
tail grocery industry understand changes in market 
concentration and market conditions due to Wal-
Mart entry. This research shows that Wal-Mart 
Supercenters are increasing market concentration 
everywhere, but primarily where they have an estab-
lished presence. In areas where Wal-Mart’s presence 
is large, they are likely taking market share from 
larger competitors. Small grocery retailers should 
look for opportunities to capitalize on market-share 
increases when one of Wal-Mart’s larger competi-
tors exits. This may also suggest that Wal-Mart is 
able to capitalize on additional economies of scale 
where their market presence is stronger.
Policy makers and those involved in the retail 
grocery industry might also note that Wal-Mart’s top 
two competitors are expanding where Wal-Mart’s 
presence is relatively small. By doing so, these 
top competitors may be positioning themselves 
to fight for market share when Wal-Mart enters or 
expands in their markets. Clearly, Wal-Mart’s top 
retail grocery competitors believe they can position 
themselves to compete for market share. Finally, 
those in the retail grocery industry and consumers 
should be aware that Wal-Mart entry means higher 
levels of retail concentration. Even though Wal-
Mart is associated with lower prices, increased retail 
grocery concentration has traditionally resulted in 
higher prices.
Data availability limits this study in two ways. 
First, in this study the effects of Wal-Mart Super-
centers on concentration are considered at the GMA 
level, a level for which data is available. However, 
retail grocery markets are much smaller than Trade 
Dimension’s GMAs. Within certain local markets, 
the effects of Wal-Mart Supercenters on grocery 
concentration could be much greater; especially in 
small, rural towns. To understand the effects of entry 
by Wal-Mart Supercenters on grocery markets, the 
spatial scale of this study would need to be reduced 
from the GMA level to a county or zip-code level. 
This would more clearly show the effects of Wal-
2 If the Dallas GMA was removed from the sample, an average 
of 1.4 top competitors would have exited the market. A large 
acquisition occurred in the Dallas GMA during the sample 
period.
Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(3)26   November 2008
Table 6. Average Annual Descriptive Statistics by Regime.
Regime 1 – Large Wal-Mart presence






Albuquerque 1.2 50.2 102.0 −8.0 24.8 3.3 −0.34 3.85
Dallas 1.4 56.2 214.5 16.5 57.0 10.5 0.71 9.36
Houston 1.3 61.8 188.0 6.8 20.5 9.0 0.29 4.21
Indianapolis 3.2 61.7 171.0 7.8 21.3 5.0 0.33 3.66
Kansas 2.1 49.8 104.5 2.3 27.8 5.0 0.10 4.54
Memphis 0.2 55.6 184.0 −3.8 65.3 13.5 −0.16 10.95
Nashville 2.0 56.9 190.8 −3.8 43.8 5.3 −0.16 6.73
New Orleans 2.4 58.9 126.8 −13.5 29.0 2.8 −0.58 4.34
Oklahoma 3.0 48.4 85.8 −5.8 33.8 6.5 −0.25 5.59
San Antonio 1.5 82.6 218.8 3.3 23.8 4.8 0.14 3.96
Springfield 3.7 51.6 47.3 1.3 32.0 3.5 0.05 4.86
St. Louis 1.3 51.9 136.3 −2.0 35.3 4.5 −0.09 5.46
Tampa −0.1 84.5 445.8 7.8 30.8 6.8 0.33 5.22
Average 1.8 59.2 170.4 0.7 34.2 6.2 0.0 5.6
Std. Deviation 1.1 11.6 98.1 8.0 13.6 3.1 0.3 2.2
Mart Supercenters on retail grocery concentration 
for specific, less-aggregated markets. Reducing the 
spatial scale of the study would also give insight 
into whether Wal-Mart Supercenters affect retail 
grocery concentration differently between urban 
and rural areas.
Second, this study is limited by temporal data 
constraints. Additional years of data would allow 
analysis of whether Wal-Mart is beginning to satu-
rate markets or whether lag effects exist between 
Wal-Mart Supercenter entry and market concentra-
tion changes. Also, additional years of data could 
be used to better understand the effects of entry by 
Wal-Mart on competitors. Due to changes in GMA 
definitions by Trade Dimensions, it was not possible 
to extend the time dimension of the dataset.
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